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cara lewis* 
 
Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours: Duck 
Tours of a Feather Can Flock Together 
 
In Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours,1 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit decided whether a trademark’s conceptual strength 
should be considered in determining whether its use is likely to cause consumer 
confusion.2 The court held that both the commercial and conceptual strength 
should be considered in determining the strength of the mark.3 In so holding, the 
majority opinion conflated the first and second elements of its trademark 
infringement analysis.4 The court failed to adhere to First Circuit precedent, which 
does not consider a mark’s legal classification in determining whether the mark will 
result in practical consumer confusion.5 The court’s new test gives conceptual 
strength more weight than commercial strength and permits alleged infringers an 
escape from admission of Lanham Act protection in the first element.6 The test used 
by the court also violates the “anti-dissection” rule of trademark infringement 
analysis.7 Finally, merging the first and second elements fails to fulfill the purpose of 
the “likelihood of confusion” analysis.8 Even if the court would have used the 
proper test and considered the mark’s conceptual strength exclusively in the first 
prong of the trademark infringement analysis and its commercial strength in the 
second prong, the court would have likely reached the same conclusion.9 

© 2010 Cara Lewis. 
 *  J.D. Candidate May 2010, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A. English, University of Maryland 
College Park, 2007. 
 1. 531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 2. Id. at 16. 
 3. Id. The strength of the mark is one of eight factors that the First Circuit uses to evaluate the second 
prong of the trademark infringement analysis. Id. at 15. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.A. 
 7. See infra Part IV.B. 
 8. See infra Part IV.C. 
 9. See infra Part IV.D. 
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i. the case 
Boston Duck Tours and Super Duck Tours offer sightseeing tours via land and 
water in the Boston area.10 Both use amphibious vehicles, commonly called “ducks” 
because the tour vehicles are DUKWs or are modeled from DUKWs, amphibious 
military vehicles used during World War II.11 
 Boston Duck began offering tours in 1994 using actual refurbished DUKWs.12 
Its amphibious vehicles bear Boston Duck Tour’s logo.13 Boston Duck has received 
national and international press coverage and received awards for its services.14 
 Super Duck began in 2001 in Portland, Maine,15 and uses custom-made 
amphibious vehicles called Hydra-Terras, which are larger and more modern than 
DUKWs.16 The company has a super-hero theme, reflected in its name “Super Duck 
Tours,” the company’s advertising, and its logo, which bears a white cartoon duck 
with muscular arms and a cape.17 Super Duck started planning operations in Boston 
by purchasing an existing tour company, New England Tours, in 2006 to obtain 
permits and licenses for its tours.18 Super Duck created a website and began 
advertising in late 2006 and early 2007, and in May 2007 introduced its duck tour, 
which takes a different path than Boston Duck.19 
 Boston Duck “owns several state and federal trademark registrations for the 
composite word mark BOSTON DUCK TOURS and a composite design mark” 
with the company’s logo and word mark, in connection with its tour service.20 There 
are disclaimers on the words “duck” and “tours” because Boston Duck does not 
have exclusive rights to those terms apart from the full registered mark.21 Boston 
Duck has two additional federal trademark registrations in connection with apparel, 
first for its composite word mark BOSTON DUCK TOURS and second for its 
composite design mark.22 It claims a first-use date of 1993 for three of the 
registrations, and 1995 as the first-use date for the word mark in connection with 
clothing.23 

 10. Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. The logo consists of a duck image and Boston Duck’s trade name. Id. at 29–30. 
 14. Id. at 8. 
 15. Id. at 9. 
 16. Id. at 8.  
 17. Id. at 8–9. Hyrdra-Terras are “virtually unsinkable,” which contributed to the company’s choice of 
name and theme of Super Duck Tours. Id. at 8. The company’s website continues the theme with a Superman 
parody: “It’s a bus. It’s a boat. It’s Super Duck!” Id. at 9.  
 18. Id. at 9. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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 Super Duck has one federal registration for SUPER DUCK TOURS as a word 
mark in connection with its tour services.24 Super Duck filed to have the mark on 
the Principal Register, but was rejected by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, which thought the mark was only descriptive.25 Super Duck instead had the 
word mark registered on the Supplemental Register in 2003, and disclaimed the use 
of the phrase “duck tours.”26 
 On July 2, 2007, Boston Duck filed a complaint against Super Duck, alleging 
federal trademark infringement under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act for “federal 
and state unfair competition, tortious interference with prospective business 
relationships, and a flock of other state and federal claims” in the district court.27 
Boston Duck requested a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 
preventing Super Duck from using its trademark, logo, “or any other mark 
confusingly similar to Boston Duck’s mark BOSTON DUCK TOURS.”28 Boston 
Duck also sought to enjoin Super Duck from interfering with Boston Duck’s 
prospective customers.29 
 On July 11, 2007, the district court held a hearing for the preliminary 
injunction.30 The court, using the eight-part likelihood of confusion test, found the 
phrase “duck tours” to be non-generic for land-water sightseeing in Boston, and 
thus eligible for trademark protection.31 The court enjoined Super Duck from using 
the term “duck tours,” as well as from using the cartoon duck as a logo in 
association with amphibious vehicle tours in the Boston area.32 The court also 
enjoined Super Duck from using “duck” in conjunction with the words “Boston” or 
“tours.”33 The court, however, denied the preliminary injunction on the tortious 
interference claim.34 
 On December 5, 2007, the district court held that Super Duck’s purchase of 
sponsored links for the phrase “Boston Duck Tours” on Google.com was not a 
trademark infringement and did not violate the preliminary injunction.35 

 24. Id. at 9–10. 
 25. Id. at 10. 
 26. Id. Marks that warrant Lanham Act protection because they are suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful may be 
registered on the Principal Register. Id. at 13. Marks that are inherently non-distinctive but are capable of re-
ceiving Lanham Act protection by acquiring a second meaning are eligible for registration on the Supplemental 
Register. Id. at 9 n.5. Generic marks cannot be registered on either the Principal or Supplemental Registers. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 527 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208 (D. Mass. 2007), rev’d, 531 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). This issue was not raised on appeal. For more information about the intersection of 
trademark infringement law and the purchase of trademarked keywords from Google, see Regina Nelson Eng, A 
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 On appeal, the First Circuit considered whether the district court’s 
preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion, and reviewed de novo the 
trademark infringement analysis.36 
ii. legal background 
The Lanham Act37 governs trademark infringement claims, which occur when an 
entity attempts to use a mark in commerce that is similar to a registered mark, such 
that its effect on consumers is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive.”38 The First Circuit uses a two-part test to evaluate a trademark 
infringement claim.39 In the first inquiry, the court determines whether the mark 
warrants trademark protection under the Lanham Act.40 In the second inquiry, the 
court determines whether the allegedly infringing use is likely to result in consumer 
confusion.41 
A. The Court First Determines Whether the Mark Warrants Trademark Protection 
Under the Lanham Act 
To succeed on an infringement action, the plaintiff must first prove that its mark 
warrants federal protection.42 The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof”43 used by any person “to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.”44 Thus, in order to be registered and warrant protection, the 
mark must be able to distinguish the applicant’s goods from those of others.45 
 A mark must be distinctive in order to qualify for registration with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office.46 An identifying mark is distinctive if it “either 
(1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary 

Likelihood of Infringement: The Purchase and Sale of Trademarks as AdWords, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 493 
(2008). 
 36. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 11. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006).  
 38. 15 U.S.C. §1114(1)(a). 
 39. Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 40. See infra Part II.A. All federal circuit courts must identify whether the trademark is protectable before it 
can proceed in determining whether it is infringed. See 15 U.S.C. §1114(1)(a). The crux of a trademark 
infringement claim is that a person “without the consent of the registant” is using a mark that is confusingly 
similar to a registered mark. Id. 
 41. See infra Part II.B. 
 42. Borinquen Biscuit Corp., 443 F.3d at 116. 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 44. Id.  
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 1052. 
 46. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).  
LEWIS.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010  6:09 PM 
 Cara Lewis 
vol. 5 no. 2 2010 361 
meaning.”47 Marks are typically classified in order of increasing distinctiveness, or 
“conceptual strength”: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful.48 The 
marks in three of the classifications—suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful—identify 
the source of the product, and therefore are inherently distinctive and warrant 
protection.49 A mark is suggestive if it “requires imagination, thought and 
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.”50 A mark is arbitrary if 
it is a word or symbol that is common language, but is arbitrarily applied to the 
product in a way that is not descriptive or suggestive.51 Finally, a mark is fanciful if it 
is a “coined word” for the purpose of functioning as a trademark.52 
 At the other end of the spectrum, generic marks are not eligible for 
registration or protection because they refer “to the genus of which the particular 
product is a species.”53 The court looks to evidence from consumer surveys, use of 
the term in media publications, use of the term by competitors in the industry, 
purchaser testimony regarding the term, and plaintiff’s use of the term to determine 
the public conception of the mark, and ultimately, whether the term is generic.54 
 Finally, a descriptive mark is not inherently distinct because it describes the 
type of product but does not inherently identify its source.55 At common law, there 
was no protection available for marks that were generic or descriptive.56 However, 
the Lanham Act provided an exception to the common law by protecting 
descriptive marks, so long as they had acquired a “second meaning.”57 According to 

 47. Id. at 769. 
 48. Id. at 768; see also Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(noting the continuum consists of five categories: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful). 
However, it is sometimes difficult to categorize a mark because a term that is in one category for one product 
may be in a different category for another product or a term may in time move from one category to another 
because its usage has changed. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976), 
overruled by N.Y. Racing Ass’n v. Perlmutter Publ., 959 F. Supp. 578 (2d Cir. 1997) (overruling the Abercrombie 
test for evaluating inherent distinctiveness). Additionally, a term could have one meaning to one group of users 
and a different meaning to a different group of users, or the same term could be used in different ways with 
respect to a single product. Id. 
 49. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. 
 50. Equine Techs., Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc., 68 F.3d 542, 544 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Blinded Veterans 
Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 51. Union Nat. Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat. Bank of Texas, Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 845 
(5th Cir. 1990). “Apple” is an example of an arbitrary term; it is a common word but does not in any way 
describe the products that Apple sells. 
 52. Id. (identifying “Xerox” and “Kodak” as examples of fanciful terms). 
 53. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.  
 54. Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 706 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 55. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
 56. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9. 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006); see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (noting descriptive marks may only be 
registered where they have acquired a second meaning). The Lanham Act, however, provided no such exception 
for generic marks. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.  
LEWIS.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010  6:09 PM 
 Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours 
362 journal of business & technology law 
the Act, a second meaning is established when the mark “has become distinctive of 
the applicant’s goods in commerce.”58 
 For the purposes of a trademark infringement claim, registration of a 
trademark is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark.”59 Thus, 
the owner of a registered trademark is entitled to a presumption that the mark is 
distinctive and merits protection.60 However, the effect of this presumption is 
dependent on the status of the mark as contestable.61 If the mark’s status is 
incontestable because its owner followed the statutory requirements of 15 U.S.C.     
§ 1065, then the presumption is conclusive.62 However, if the mark is still contest-
able, then the defendant in the trademark infringement suit may allege that the 
mark is not distinctive and only descriptive.63 Thus, demonstrating the mark is 
registered but still contestable shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the 
defendant, who must rebut the presumption that the mark warrants protection, 
using sufficient evidence.64 
 Finally, under the Lanham Act, an applicant with an otherwise registrable 
composite mark may disclaim an unregistrable component of a mark to avoid 
rejection.65 The disclaimer demonstrates that the applicant does not have exclusive 
rights to the disclaimed portion of the composite mark.66 However, all elements of a 
composite mark cannot be disclaimed because this makes the mark unregistrable.67 

 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). 
 60. Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 117 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Two 
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776 (indicating a secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a trademark infringement 
claim where the mark is inherently distinctive). 
 61. Borinquen Biscuit Corp., 443 F.3d at 117. 
 62. Id. A mark is incontestable under 15 U.S.C. § 1065 if the mark has been registered and in continuous 
use for five consecutive years after registration, and is still in use in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006). There 
must also be “no final decision adverse to registrant’s claim of ownership” of the mark, no pending proceeding 
regarding the registrant’s ownership, an affidavit filed with the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office 
within a year after the conclusion of five years of continuous use stating the mark has been in continuous use 
and is still in use in commerce, and no incontestable right in a mark will be acquired in a mark that is generic or 
the portion of the mark that is generic. Id. § 1065(1)–(4). 
 63. Borinquen Biscuit Corp., 443 F.3d at 117. 
 64. Id. (citing Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 373 (1st Cir. 1980)). The alleged infringer 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the mark is merely descriptive before the burden of proof 
will shift back to the plaintiff to prove a secondary meaning. Id. at 118. If the infringer fails to prove 
descriptiveness by a preponderance of the evidence, the presumption of distinctiveness still holds. Id. 
 65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a).  
 66. Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l, Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The disclaimer provision 
strikes a balance between providing protection for composite marks with unregistrable components and 
preventing “an applicant from claiming exclusive rights to disclaimed portions apart from composite marks.” 
Id. 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a). 
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B. The Court Next Determines Whether the Allegedly Infringing Mark Is Likely to 
Cause Confusion 
In the second part of the trademark infringement analysis, the court analyzes 
whether the “allegedly infringing use is likely to result in consumer confusion.”68 
Developed in Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp.,69 the First 
Circuit assesses the likelihood of consumer confusion by weighing eight factors, 
which measure the mark’s practical impression on consumers.70 The court applies 
the eight Pignons factors in no particular sequence and depending upon the facts of 
the case, may give some more weight than others.71 In evaluating the eight factors, 
the court must be careful not to violate the anti-dissection rule, which requires the 
court to review the “total effect of the designation, rather than a comparison of 
individual features.”72 
 One of the eight factors the court evaluates is the strength of the mark.73 In the 
First Circuit, the evaluation of the mark’s strength is exclusively dependent on the 
practical, commercial strength of the mark and not the legal classification of the 
mark, which is typically analyzed under the first prong of infringement analysis.74 
Factors commonly considered in evaluating the strength of the mark include the 

 68. Borinquen Biscuit Corp., 443 F.3d at 116. A mark causes consumer confusion when its similarity to a 
registered mark causes consumers to believe that the good or service it represents is in some way connected to 
the good or service the registered mark represents. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). A mark is also confusing when it 
misrepresents goods or services as those of another entity’s goods or services. Id. § 1114(1)(b).  
 69. 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting the First Circuit uses a 
consultation of these eight factors rather than a mechanical formula); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 203 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting the facts of the 
case rendered some of the factors irrelevant or difficult to apply). 
 72. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487 (quoting Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 
444 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations omitted)). Composite trademarks, or marks containing more than one 
element, should be considered as a whole in evaluating the “likelihood of confusion” prong of the trademark 
infringement analysis. 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 23-179 to 23-180 (J. Thomas 
McCarthy ed., 4th ed. 2009). The rationale behind the rule is that the overall commercial impression of a 
trademark comes from the trademark as a whole, not its individual components. Id.; see also Estate of P.D. 
Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545–46 (1920). 
 73. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 491. 
 74. See Attrezzi, 436 F.3d at 40 (indicating that considering a mark’s legal classification in its strength of 
mark analysis “is not a proposition supported by any First Circuit case law and its logic is not apparent”). 
However, other circuits consider both a mark’s conceptual and commercial strength in the “strength of mark” 
analysis. See Am. Rice., Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering the 
strength of the mark in two ways: where it falls on the distinctiveness spectrum and the standing of the mark in 
the marketplace); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1988) (evaluating the 
strength of the mark by its conceptual strength plus third parties’ impression of the mark); Safeway Stores, Inc. 
v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1164 (11th Cir. 1982) (same). 
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“length of time the mark has been used, its renown in the plaintiff’s field of 
business, and the plaintiff’s actions to promote the mark.”75 
 The court also contemplates the similarity of the marks.76 In evaluating the 
similarity of the marks, the court looks to the total effect of the mark, rather than a 
comparison of the marks’ individual features.77 Additionally, the court gives weight 
to the dominant portion of the composite marks.78 Evidence reviewed in analyzing 
the similarity of the marks includes the sound, sight, and meaning of the marks.79 
The court also considers the comparability of the goods and services represented by 
the mark.80 In evaluating this factor, the court may review not only the type and 
features of the product, but also the price and appearance of the product.81 
 The court examines the relationship between the parties’ channel of trade, the 
relationship between the parties’ advertising, and the classes of prospective 
purchasers.82 The court often considers these three factors together because they are 
frequently factually interrelated.83 In evaluating these factors, the court looks to 
evidence of the venues and locations where the product or service is sold, the type 
and location of advertising, the targeted market, and the content of advertising.84 
 Another factor the court investigates is evidence of actual confusion between 
the marks.85 Evidence of actual confusion is the best predictor of future confusion.86 
For this factor, the court typically looks to evidence such as consumers contacting 

 75. Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortgage Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Equine Techs., 
Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc. 68 F.3d 542, 547 (1st Cir. 1995)); see also Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. 
Group, 376 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (considering market share percentages, consumer surveys, amount 
invested in promoting the mark and length of time the mark was used in evaluating the strength of the mark). 
 76. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Beacon Mut. Ins. Co., 376 F.3d at 18 (finding similarity of marks where the dominant portion of both 
marks was “Beacon”). 
 79. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 817 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 80. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487. 
 81. See id. at 487–88 (evaluating the similarity of the goods by comparing the features, appearance, 
accessories, and price of the cameras); see also Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(looking to the breadth of products the mark applied to in evaluating the similarity of goods). 
 82. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 488. 
 83. See id. (considering simultaneously the relationship between the parties’ channels of trade, the 
relationship between the parties’ advertising, and the classes of prospective purchasers because the same facts 
illustrated these three factors). 
 84. Id. at 488–89. 
 85. Id. at 489. 
 86. Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 376 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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one company seeking the product or service of the other company87 or media 
confusion regarding the products.88 
 Finally, the court may consider the defendant’s intent in adopting the mark.89 
In determining whether there was bad faith in using the mark, courts have looked 
to evidence of advice from counsel regarding adoption of the mark,90 as well as 
evidence of intent to benefit from the reputation of the holder of the other mark.91 
iii. the court’s reasoning 
The First Circuit held that Boston Duck’s trademark infringement claim was not 
likely to succeed on the merits, and therefore the district court erred in issuing a 
preliminary injunction.92 Writing for the majority, Judge Lipez first reviewed the 
standard for deciding a motion for preliminary injunction.93 The court noted that 
the touchstone factor of the preliminary injunction inquiry is the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success on the merits.94 The court considered the likelihood of success 
on the composite word mark infringement claim separately from the design mark 
infringement claim.95 
A. The Court’s Word Mark Infringement Analysis 
In evaluating the first prong of a trademark infringement claim, the court 
performed a genericism analysis of the term “duck tours,” despite Super Duck’s 
admission “that the mark BOSTON DUCK TOURS is entitled to trademark 

 87. See Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (listing instances of customers 
confusing one of the company’s stores as a subsidiary of the other company); Pignons, 657 F.2d at 489–90 
(considering instances in which orders for the products of one company were sent to the other company). 
 88. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 489 (analyzing alleged misspellings of the trademark in advertisements, catalogues, 
magazines and newspapers as evidence of actual confusion). 
 89. Id. at 491. 
 90. See Attrezzi, 436 F.3d at 40 (finding bad faith where the company was advised by in-house counsel of 
the risk of confusion and adopted the mark regardless). 
 91. Volkswagenverk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that the 
defendant adopted the mark with the intention of indicating his auto repair shop specialized in the repair of 
Volkswagen cars in an attempt to benefit from Volkswagen’s reputation). 
 92. Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 31 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 93. Id. at 11. The court weighs several factors in a preliminary injunction inquiry, including the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success on the merits, the potential for irreparable harm without an injunction, whether issuing an 
injunction would burden defendants less than denying an injunction would burden the plaintiffs, and the effect 
on the public interest. Id.  
 94. Id. (quoting Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 674 (1st Cir. 1998), rev’d on other 
grounds, 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001)). When considering a preliminary injunction on appeal, the court reviews 
the findings of fact for clear error and the substantive legal claims de novo, overturning the district court 
decision only if the court clearly erred or abused its discretion. Id. (quoting Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
 95. Compare id. at 14 (“We begin with Boston Duck’s trademark infringement claim against Super Duck 
based on the parties’ word marks.”), with id. at 27 (“We turn now to the infringement analysis of the parties’ 
composite design marks.” (footnote omitted)). 
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protection, thereby conceding the first element” of the trademark infringement 
claim.96 However, as a result of Super Duck’s concession that Boston Duck’s mark 
was protectable under the Lanham Act, the court noted that its main focus was on 
the second prong of the trademark infringement analysis—likelihood of 
confusion—which uses the eight-factor Pignons test.97 
 Before specifically addressing the eight Pignons factors, the court concentrated 
the beginning of its likelihood of confusion analysis on evaluating the genericism of 
the phrase “duck tours” because of its impact on the Pignons factors, particularly 
strength of the mark.98 The court stated that the district court was proper in 
analyzing both the conceptual and commercial strength of the plaintiff’s mark in 
the likelihood of confusion analysis, particularly where a mark contains an arguably 
generic phrase,99 despite First Circuit precedent, which focuses solely on commercial 
strength.100 The court feared that by measuring the strength of BOSTON DUCK 
TOURS “only on the basis of practical, commercial factors, [it] would risk affording 
greater protection to the mark than is warranted. Specifically, [the court] would risk 
recognizing commercial strength that is the result of the descriptive force of the 
unprotectable generic element ‘duck tours.’”101 The court thus determined that it 
was not foreclosed from assessing both the conceptual and commercial strength in 
its evaluation of the likelihood of confusion analysis.102 Mirroring the district court’s 
analysis by evaluating the mark’s conceptual and commercial strength, the First 
Circuit nevertheless rejected the district court’s conclusion and determined that the 

 96. Id. at 11. Generic terms are incapable of becoming trademarked because they do not identify the source 
of the product, but rather, describe the product. Id. at 14. 
 97. Id. at 15. 
 98. Id. at 15–16. The court noted that the district court did not evaluate the strength of the composite 
mark, BOSTON DUCK TOURS, but rather, only evaluated the strength of the phrase “duck tours.” Id. at 16. If 
the district court’s conclusion that the phrase “duck tours” was non-generic and thus capable of protection 
under the Lanham Act was erroneous, then the district court’s analysis of the other Pignons factors was affected, 
so the First Circuit began by analyzing the genericism of the phrase “duck tours.” Id. at 16 n.15. The court noted 
that analyzing the genericism of the phrase “duck tours” did not violate the anti-dissection rule because it was 
only using this analysis as a preliminary step in determining customer reaction to the conflicting composites as 
a whole. Id. at 17 n.20. 
 99. Id. at 16–17. The court indicated that a mark’s classification on the spectrum of distinctiveness is 
dependent on societal and market conditions. Id. at 17 n.17 (“Words do not exist in a vacuum. They have 
definitions, associations, and connotations, all of which contribute to the conceptual strength analysis because 
they reflect how consumers view the words in the marketplace.”). 
 100. See Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating practical matters and not 
legal classification of a mark are important in determining the strength of a mark). The court distinguished this 
case from precedent in Attrezzi, noting that the Attrezzi court considered a mark with only one element and was 
determining whether a mark was inherently weak because it was suggestive rather than arbitrary. Boston Duck 
Tours, 531 F.3d at 17 n.18 (citing Attrezzi, 436 F.3d at 40). In this case, the court was instead considering a mark 
with multiple elements and a “generic” classification rather than suggestive or arbitrary. Id. at 17. 
 101. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 17. 
 102. Id. at 17 n.19. 
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phrase “duck tours” is generic.103 The court found that in addition to using the 
wrong legal standard to evaluate a mark’s genericism,104 the district court erred in 
focusing on the terms “duck” and “tours” separately.105 
 After reaching the conclusion that the phrase “duck tours” was generic and 
therefore did not warrant protection under the Lanham Act, the court, using the 
eight-factor Pignons analysis, evaluated the likelihood of consumer confusion of the 
composite mark, BOSTON DUCK TOURS.106 
 In analyzing the strength of the composite mark, the court again considered 
both the mark’s conceptual and commercial strength.107 In evaluating its conceptual 
strength, the court stated the composite mark was highly descriptive because it 
combines a general phrase with “Boston,” a weak term deserving minimal 
protection.108 Though the court found that the composite mark was weak, its 
relative weakness was mitigated by the secondary meaning developed from its 
continuous use in the Boston area for thirteen years.109 In evaluating the marks’ 
commercial strength, the court determined that Boston Duck had received 
substantial national and international press coverage, as well as awards for its 
services in the Boston area.110 Additionally, the company was using six times the 
amount of “ducks” it started with in 1994, and the number of customers had 
significantly increased.111 Thus, the court concluded that the composite mark 
BOSTON DUCK TOURS was “reasonably strong overall as an identifier of Boston 
Duck’s tour services in the Boston area, although part of the mark—‘duck tours’—
is entitled to no trademark protection at all.”112 

 103. Id. at 18. The court found that the district court relied exclusively on the dictionary definition of 
“duck,” which did not include any reference to DUKWs or other amphibious vehicles. Id. at 16. In finding that 
the tour does not involve ducks, but rather is a play on the acronym DUKW, the district court believed “duck 
tours” was non-generic because it does not refer to the general meaning of the word. Id. 
 104. Id. at 18. The district court should have relied on several factors, including consumer surveys, use of 
the term in media publications, use of the term by competitors, purchaser testimony concerning the phrase, and 
the plaintiff’s use of the term; rather than just the dictionary definition. Id. (citing Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster 
Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 706 (1st Cir. 2007)). Had the district court evaluated these factors, it would have 
found that the Boston Globe used the term “duck tours” at least twice in its publication and that of 36 
companies giving amphibious tour services in the world, 32 used the word “duck” in its name. Id. at 19. 
Additionally, the court should have considered that Boston Duck itself used the phrase “duck tours” generically 
on its website, as well as in documents provided to the court. Id. at 20. 
 105. Id. at 18–19 (finding the lower court should have considered the terms together because a complete 
phrase may signify something different than the sum of its parts). Ironically, in this part of the analysis, the 
court is considering the genericism of the phrase “duck tours” separate from the sum of the composite mark, 
BOSTON DUCK TOURS. Id. at 17–18.  
 106. Id. at 23. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 23–24. 
 112. Id. at 24. 
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 The court next analyzed the degree of similarity between the two composite 
marks, BOSTON DUCK TOURS and SUPER DUCK TOURS.113 The court only 
compared the non-generic components of the marks, “Boston” and “Super,” 
determining they were reasonably dissimilar because they had different looks, 
sounds, and meanings, though each was two syllables and followed by the same 
two-word phrase.114 
 Next, the court determined that the services offered by Boston Duck and 
Super Duck were virtually identical, with the exception of their tour routes.115 The 
court considered three of the Pignons factors together—the relationship between 
the parties’ channels of trade, the relationship between the parties’ advertising, and 
the classes of prospective purchasers—and determined that the services had 
significant overlap and the two companies were close competitors.116 
 In analyzing the evidence of actual confusion, the court concluded that the 
documented instances of actual confusion by customers who thought the two 
companies were affiliated were diminished in value because they stemmed from the 
genericism of “duck tours” and Boston Duck’s lack of competition for thirteen 
years.117 
 Finally, the court analyzed Super Duck’s intent in adopting the mark and 
concluded Super Duck’s adoption of the mark was not suspect, similar to the 
district court’s conclusion, because the marks are reasonably dissimilar as a result of 
using the generic phrase “duck tours.”118 The court also noted that Super Duck did 
not act in bad faith because they adopted their mark in Portland, Maine several 
years before Boston Duck was created.119 
 Thus, the court ultimately concluded that the district court erred in 
determining that Boston Duck was likely to succeed on the merits of its trademark 
infringement claim because the analysis of the Pignons factors did not establish a 
likelihood of confusion.120 
 

 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 25. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. In its cursory acceptance of the lower court’s analysis, the court noted that Super Duck did not 
dispute that it is a close competitor with Boston Duck. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 26.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 26–27. 
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B. Design Mark Infringement Analysis 
The court also went through the infringement analysis for Boston Duck’s composite 
design mark.121 The court decided that the lower court failed to properly analyze all 
of the Pignons factors in analyzing the likelihood of confusion between the marks, 
and thus its analysis was too limited.122 
 In analyzing the likelihood of confusion of the design marks, the court again 
went through a genericism analysis and determined the district court’s comparison 
was improper because it assumed all of Super Duck’s logo elements were 
nongeneric.123 Though Super Duck contended that “virtually every duck tour 
company in the country uses a cartoon duck in its logo,” the court determined that 
many did not.124 The record lacked evidence demonstrating whether the public 
found the image of a cartoon duck synonymous with duck tours.125 The court also 
determined that because there were available effective alternatives, giving one entity 
exclusive use of the design would not give an advantage.126 However, the court 
ultimately concluded that it could not find the district court clearly erred in finding 
the mark non-generic, noting the mark was highly descriptive of its offered services 
and therefore a weak identifier of the source.127 
 The court then analyzed the strength of the composite design mark, 
considering again both the conceptual and commercial strength of the mark.128 The 
court’s analysis was similar to the word mark analysis, concluding that due to its 
long-term use in the Boston area, “the composite design mark is reasonably strong, 
despite the fact that it contains elements that have an inherently weak capacity as 
source-identifiers.”129 
 Next the court analyzed the similarity of the marks, finding the marks 
substantially dissimilar after considering the “colors used, the text, and the various 
design elements contained therein.”130 The court again noted that despite sharing a 
duck, the mark is descriptive of its services, and not its source.131 

 121. Id. at 27. 
 122. Id. The district court only considered the similarity of the design marks separately. Boston Duck Tours, 
LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 514 F. Supp. 2d, 119, 124 (D. Mass. 2007), rev’d, 531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 123. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 27–28. The court noted that the strength of the mark weighs heavily in 
the consideration of other factors. Id. 
 124. Id. at 28. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 29. 
 129. Id. (noting that its strength is mostly derived from its exclusive use as the only duck tour provider in 
the Boston area for thirteen years). 
 130. Id. (indicating that the only similarity between the marks was the cartoon duck—the background 
scene, coloring, and font were all distinctive). 
 131. Id. at 30. 
LEWIS.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010  6:09 PM 
 Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours 
370 journal of business & technology law 
 The court also reviewed evidence of actual confusion, concluding there was no 
specific evidence directly traceable to the companies’ design marks.132 For the 
remaining five Pignons factors, the court used the same analysis it used in its word 
mark analysis because these factors related to the parties and not the marks 
themselves.133 
 The court concluded that although five of the factors, including the strength 
of the mark, weighed in favor of Boston Duck, the lack of evidence demonstrating 
bad faith by Super Duck in adopting the mark went against finding infringement of 
the design mark.134 Thus, the court held that the district court erred in determining 
Boston Duck was likely to be successful on the merits of the design mark 
infringement claim and erroneously issued a preliminary injunction.135 
C. Concurrence 
Judge DiClerico concurred with the majority that the preliminary injunction was 
erroneous.136 However, Judge DiClerico would not have permitted a consideration 
of the genericism of the marks in the likelihood of confusion analysis: since both 
parties conceded that the word marks were protected under the Lanham Act, and 
thus satisfied the first element, the crux of the case was in the second element, the 
likelihood of confusion test.137 In considering the eight factors, particularly the 
strength of mark, Judge DiClerico considered only the commercial, practical 
strength of the marks, following First Circuit precedent.138 Despite using a different 
test, Judge DiClerico reached the same decision as the majority, finding that the 
district court improperly issued the preliminary injunction.139 
iv. analysis 
In Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours, the First Circuit held that Boston Duck’s 
word and design mark infringement claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits, 
and therefore the district court erroneously issued a preliminary injunction.140 The 
conflated test adopted by the First Circuit considers the conceptual and commercial 
strength in the eighth Pignons factor, “strength of the mark,” thus ignoring First 
Circuit precedent and giving undue weight to a mark’s legal classification by 

 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 31 (DiClerico, J., concurring in judgment). 
 137. Id. at 32–33. 
 138. Id. at 34–37. 
 139. Id. at 38. 
 140. Id. at 31 (majority opinion). 
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considering it in both prongs of the infringement analysis.141 The Super Duck Tours 
infringement test also violates the “anti-dissection” rule.142 Finally, the test offered 
by the Super Duck Tours court fails to fulfill the purpose of the “likelihood of 
confusion” analysis, which is determining the strength of the mark after its 
existence in the market.143 However, even if the court used the proper test, and 
considered the first and second prongs separately, it would likely have reached the 
same conclusion.144 
A. The Court Ignored First Circuit Precedence and Gave Undue Weight to a Mark’s 
Legal Classification by Conflating the First and Second Prongs of the Trademark 
Infringement Analysis 
The First Circuit had previously adhered to a trademark infringement analysis that 
considered the mark’s conceptual strength strictly in the first prong of its analysis, 
and only analyzed its practical, commercial strength in the second prong.145 A court 
is bound by precedent, unless there is an intervening circumstance that would 
warrant a change.146 In this case there were no intervening circumstances that 
warranted a change in the administration of the traditional “strength of mark” 
analysis because the facts of Super Duck Tours were typical of a trademark 
infringement case.147 Evaluating the conceptual strength—the mark’s placement on 
the spectrum of distinctiveness—in the second prong was not “a proposition 
supported by any First Circuit case law and its logic [was] not apparent.”148 
However, it should be noted that other circuits do consider a mark’s conceptual and 
commercial strength in their “strength of mark” analysis.149 Regardless of the tests 
used in other circuits, the First Circuit in Attrezzi emphasized that the focus of the 
strength analysis was the mark’s perception in the marketplace, not the mark’s legal 
classification.150 Though the Super Duck Tours court attempted to distinguish 

 141. See infra Part IV.A. 
 142. See infra Part IV.B. 
 143. See infra Part IV.C. 
 144. See infra Part IV.D. 
 145. See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp, 657 F.2d 482, 491 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(creating the eight-factor infringement analysis test and analyzing only evidence of practical, commercial 
strength in evaluating the “strength of the mark” factor). 
 146. Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 33 n.35 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Amato v. 
United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2006)). 
 147. Id. at 8–11 (the facts in Boston Duck Tours are not dramatically different from other infringement cases 
such that it would warrant a different test—the court was merely considering another word and design mark 
infringement case with basic word similarities and color/design similarities). 
 148. Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2006).  
 149. See supra note 74. 
 150. Attrezzi, 436 F.3d at 40. 
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Attrezzi from the instant case,151 the First Circuit’s precedent should have foreclosed 
the court from considering a mark’s conceptual strength in the second prong of the 
infringement analysis, as it is already evaluated in the first prong.152 
 By considering the conceptual strength of the mark in both the first and 
second parts of the analysis, the court gave the mark’s legal classification twice as 
much weight as its commercial strength. In determining the strength of the mark in 
the likelihood of confusion analysis, the Super Duck Tours court went through a 
“genericism” analysis, evaluating the mark’s conceptual strength.153 However, the 
genericism analysis is part of determining whether the mark is due protection under 
the Lanham Act, which is the first prong of the infringement analysis.154 Having 
already conceded that Boston Duck’s mark is protectable under the Lanham Act, 
the court should have limited the parties to arguing only the second prong: the 
likelihood of confusion analysis.155 Thus, by considering the mark’s conceptual 
strength again during the likelihood of confusion analysis, the court gave twice the 
consideration to the mark’s conceptual strength than to its commercial, practical 
strength.156 
It seems the majority was motivated, at least in part, to consider the mark’s 
conceptual strength in the second prong of the infringement analysis because the 
court did not agree with Super Duck’s concession that the mark deserved Lanham 
Act protection.157 By performing a genericism analysis of the word mark in the 
second prong, the court was able to effectively sidestep the fact that Super Duck had 
already conceded the first prong.158 Thus, the court opened up the possibility for 
future alleged infringers who concede the first element and admit the plaintiff’s 

 151. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 17 n.18 (noting that the mark in Attrezzi was not a composite mark, 
unlike the composite marks at issue in this case). The court also elicited concern that failing to consider a 
mark’s conceptual strength, especially when the composite mark contains a generic word or phrase, could 
potentially result in giving the mark more protection than necessary. Id. at 17. Essentially, the court would find 
commercial strength that is derived from the generic portion of the word. Id.  
 152. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (evaluating the mark’s placement on 
the distinctiveness spectrum in determining whether the mark warranted protection under the Lanham Act). 
 153. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 16–18. 
 154. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (noting that a term is protected based on where it falls on the spectrum 
of distinctiveness). 
 155. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 33 (DiClerico, J., concurring in judgment). 
 156. Compare id. at 9, 16 (majority opinion) (analyzing the mark’s legal classification in the likelihood of 
confusion analysis despite Super Duck conceding Boston Duck’s marks are protected and thus Boston Duck 
satisfies the first prong in the analysis), with Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 116–
21 (1st Cir. 2006) (analyzing the mark’s legal classification in the first prong of the trademark infringement 
analysis and solely its commercial strength in the second prong of the analysis, likelihood of confusion). 
 157. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 17 (emphasizing that by measuring the strength of the word mark “only 
on the basis of practical, commercial factors, [the court] would risk affording greater protection to the mark 
than is warranted”). 
 158. See id. at 11 (stating that although Super Duck “acknowledged that the mark BOSTON DUCK TOURS 
is entitled to trademark protection, thereby conceding the first element of Boston Duck’s trademark 
infringement claim,” the court still evaluated the genericism of the phrase “duck tours”). 
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mark is protectable, like Super Duck, to later renege that concession and challenge 
the mark’s legal classification in the second part of the infringement analysis. This 
may potentially give rise to increased litigation over already agreed upon issues, and 
essentially permit alleged infringers to collaterally challenge a mark’s legal 
classification.159 
B. The Conflated Test Violates the “Anti-Dissection” Rule 
By analyzing the phrase “duck tours” separately from its composite mark, the 
majority violated the “anti-dissection” rule.160 When analyzing a trademark 
infringement case, the court must consider composite marks as a whole in 
determining the likelihood of confusion prong.161 The court is thus required when 
analyzing the eight Pignons factors to review “the total effect of the designation, 
rather than a comparison of individual features.”162 The anti-dissection rule ensures 
that courts evaluate the mark in the same way as a prospective buyer—by 
considering its commercial impression as a whole.163 Here, the court separated the 
composite marks into two pieces: “duck tours” and the preceding word, either 
“Boston” or “Super.”164 Though the court claimed that it was not violating the anti-
dissection rule by evaluating whether the “duck tours” component of the mark is 
generic,165 the court ultimately dissected the word marks in evaluating the marks’ 
likelihood of confusion by comparing only the different components of the marks, 
“Boston” and “Super.”166 By considering the likelihood of confusion of only the 
individual components of the marks, the court failed to evaluate the marks as a 
whole, in the way that a consumer in the marketplace would perceive the marks.167 

 159. See id. at 33 (DiClerico, J., concurring in judgment) (indicating that the case should not turn on 
whether part of the mark is entitled to trademark protection because the parties already admitted in the first 
prong that the marks are entitled to trademark protection). 
 160. Id. 
 161. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 72. 
 162. Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting 
Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 444 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations 
omitted)). Compare Alpha, 616 F.2d at 444 (finding likelihood of confusion between two marks both utilizing 
the word “Alpha” was low because of the word’s close proximity on the product to the uniquely identifying 
manufacturer’s name and dissimilar packaging), with Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 376 F.3d 
8, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding similarity of marks where the dominant portion of both marks was “Beacon”).  
 163. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 72. 
 164. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 15–16 (majority opinion) (analyzing the genericism of the phrase “duck 
tours” separately from the composite term in the likelihood of confusion prong of the trademark infringement 
analysis). 
 165. Id. at 17 n.20 (claiming that the court is not violating the anti-dissection rule because it is a 
“preliminary” analysis of probable customer reaction to the conflicting composite marks). 
 166. See id. at 23 (evaluating the strength of the mark and stating that the mark combined a generic phrase, 
“duck tours,” with “Boston,” a descriptive term, deserving minimal protection). 
 167. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 72 (noting that the purpose of 
the anti-dissection rule is to ensure that the court evaluates the mark as a consumer would—by its whole 
commercial impression); see also 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS 5-44 (Anne Gilson Lalonde, ed. 2009) (“Consumers 
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Thus, the majority violated the anti-dissection rule, which prohibits consideration 
of individual pieces of a composite mark in the likelihood of confusion analysis.168 
C. Conflating the First and Second Elements Fails to Fulfill the Purpose of the 
“Likelihood of Confusion” Analysis 
By conflating the first and second elements of the trademark infringement analysis, 
particularly in the “strength of mark” factor, the court failed to fulfill the purpose of 
the “likelihood of confusion” analysis. The purpose of the second prong of the 
trademark infringement analysis is to determine whether the mark’s use in the 
marketplace is likely to create confusion.169 In order to evaluate the mark’s 
likelihood of confusion in the marketplace, the court must look to practical matters, 
such as “the length of time a mark has been used and the relative renown in its field; 
the strength of the mark in plaintiff’s field of business; and the plaintiff’s action in 
promoting the mark.”170 Analyzing a mark’s place on the spectrum of distinctiveness 
does not provide any information about the mark’s actual use in the marketplace 
and actual confusion among consumers.171 Thus, by conflating the first part of the 
analysis, which considers the “legal issue of a mark’s conceptual strength,” and the 
second part of the infringement analysis, which focuses on “the practical issue of its 
commercial strength,” the court failed to fulfill the purpose of the likelihood of 
confusion analysis by failing to focus on the mark’s practical use in the 
marketplace.172 
D. The Court Would Have Reached the Same Conclusion If It Considered the First and 
Second Elements Separately 
Though the court erred in considering the marks’ legal classifications in the 
likelihood of confusion analysis, had the court used the appropriate test, it would 
have reached the same conclusion that Boston Duck was unlikely to succeed on the 
merits of its infringement claim.173 Both parties conceded that Boston Duck’s 
composite marks were protectable, and in fact protected, under the Lanham Act.174 
Thus, the case should have exclusively hinged on the second part of the 
infringement analysis, the eight-factor likelihood of confusion test.175 

under actual product selection circumstances rarely analyze trademarks minutely or compare their various 
elements.”). 
 168. See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 169. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 34 (DiClerico, J., concurring in judgment). 
 170. Equine Techs., Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc., 68 F.3d 542, 547 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Keds Corp. v. 
Renee Int’l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 171. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 34.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Compare id. at 31 (majority opinion), with id. at 38 (DiClerico, J., concurring in judgment). 
 174. Id. at 33 (DiClerico, J., concurring in judgment). 
 175. Id. 
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 Under the “strength of mark” factor, the court, considering only evidence of 
the mark’s practical, commercial strength, would have likely found Boston Duck’s 
composite marks were relatively weak.176 In analyzing the strength of mark, the 
court should have considered evidence of the mark’s source-identifying strength in 
the marketplace, such as length of the mark’s use, the holder’s renown in the 
industry, and the holder’s efforts to promote and protect the mark.177 Though 
Boston Duck used its marks exclusively in the Boston area for over a decade, it is 
not the first company or longest-running duck tour in the industry—there are 
many other companies offering the same service using the word “duck” or “duck 
tour” in their marks.178 Although Boston Duck’s marks are widely recognized in 
Boston, the common use of the phrase “duck tours” in describing the service 
offered by Boston Duck renders the mark weak.179 
 The court would have likely found that the similarity of the marks, 
considering the total effect of the marks, is minimal.180 Though both marks contain 
the phrase “duck tours,” the marks have different first words, “Boston” and 
“Super,” and the court would have likely found the overall impression of the marks 
suggests the same service offered by two different companies.181 The logos both 
show ducks, though in different contexts, and offer different colors and themes.182 
Thus, the logos would have reinforced the lack of similarity between the companies’ 
marks. 
 In evaluating actual confusion of the marks, the court would have likely found 
that the evidence of confusion was due to Boston Duck offering the only duck tour 
service in the Boston area for thirteen years, not because of the marks.183 Also, the 
court would have likely found that companies’ channels of trade, advertising, and 
customers are shared because the parties concede these elements.184 Finally, the 
court would have also likely found the similarity of services between Boston Duck 
and Super Duck is virtually identical. 185 
 Thus, in weighing the eight factors in the likelihood of confusion analysis, 
without considering the marks’ conceptual strength, the court would have probably 

 176. See id. at 37. 
 177. See id. at 36. 
 178. Id. at 37. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. at 34 (noting that if the dominant features of the marks are similar, then that may cause 
confusion and that disclaimed portions of marks are typically not the dominant part of a composite word 
mark). 
 181. Id. at 35. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 35–36 (noting that the majority of confusion between the two companies arose during Super 
Duck’s first weeks of operation). 
 184. Id. at 35. 
 185. Id.; see also id. at 25 (majority opinion) (finding that the similarity of services offered by the two 
companies is virtually identical excepting the actual tour routes). 
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found that while some of the factors show a tendency for consumer confusion, most 
of the marks weigh strongly against finding a likelihood of consumer confusion.186 
Though the court used a conflated test that could be problematic in the future, the 
court would have ultimately reached the same holding using the appropriate test, 
finding that the district court improperly issued the preliminary injunction.187 
v. conclusion 
The court held that Boston Duck failed to establish a likelihood of success on the 
merits of its trademark infringement claims and thus the district court erred in 
issuing a preliminary injunction.188 In so holding, the court conflated the first and 
second elements of the trademark infringement analysis.189 The court ignored First 
Circuit precedent, which does not consider a mark’s conceptual, legal classification 
in the likelihood of confusion analysis.190 In so doing, the court gives conceptual 
strength more weight than commercial strength and permits future alleged 
infringers an escape from conceding that the mark qualifies for Lanham Act 
protection in the first element of the trademark analysis.191 Additionally, the court’s 
new test violates the “anti-dissection” rule of trademark infringement analysis.192 
Finally, the Super Duck Tours test fails to fulfill the purpose of the likelihood of 
confusion analysis.193 Despite merging the first and second elements, if the court had 
used the proper test and considered these elements separately, it would have likely 
reached the same conclusion.194 By following this particular test, the First Circuit 
may have been attempting to conform to other circuits’ tests, which consider a 
mark’s conceptual strength and commercial strength in the “strength of mark” 
analysis.195 However, the fact that other circuits are using that particular test does 
not make it the correct test—the anti-dissection rule, the purpose of the “likelihood 
of confusion” test, and the doubled weight of the mark’s conceptual strength are 
still issues that make the conflated test problematic.196 Thus, unless and until the 
Supreme Court decides whether the conceptual strength of a mark should be 
considered in evaluating a mark’s likelihood of confusion, the First Circuit should 
continue to follow its precedent and continue to consider a mark’s conceptual 
strength only in the first part of the infringement analysis. 
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